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expressly provided that the husband's ability should accompany his fail-
ure or neglect to provide. "Ability" in statutes authorizing a divorce
when the husband refuses or neglects to provide for his wife has been
construed by some courts to mean the possession of property which can
be applied to that purpose. Thus the divorce was denied where the
husband was imprisoned, Hammond v. Hammond, 15 R.I. 40, 23 Ad.
143 (1885) ; where husband had only daily earnings to support himself
and wife, Stewart v. Stewart, i55 Mich. 421, 119 N.W. 444 (1909),
where husband did not have requisite amount of money or property even
though he was shiftless and lazy, Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 58 Vt.
555, 5 Adt. 401 (1886); Berry v. Berry, 18 O.N.P. (N.S.) 521
(1915).
It is generally held that the word "gross" is not redundant, that it
means something more than mere neglect. "Gross" means some cir-
cumstances of aggravation, or wilfulness, 14 0. Jur. p. 394, indignity
or aggravation or insult. In re Gross Neglect, 8 Ohio Dec. 701 (1897).
Examples of such circumstances are: insulting language, Holland v.
Holland, 8 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 46o (x892), or excessive drinking,
Zdgler v. Zeigler, 7 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 139 (876) or gambling
away the family income, Holland v. Holland, supra, or refusal of wife
to cohabit for an unreasonable length of time and failure to perform
household duties, Leach v. Leach, 46 Kan. 724 (i89I), or, after get-
ting his property, driving her husband from the house and preferring
against him a false charge of insanity, Osterhout v. Osterhout, 30 Kan.
746 (1883). But in Dunbar v. Dunbar, 4 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 237
(0878) a gross neglect of duty was not established where the wife
ordered her husband to leave the house and finally abandoned him
after getting his property.
As the court in the principal case observed, gross neglect of duty
is elusive of definition. There is little doubt, however, that the sound
discretion of the court, which is the ultimate test, is based on social
policies and the special facts of each case.
R. HAROLD THOMAS.
MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE BASED ON AGREEMENT
-PROVISION FOR ALIMONY AND SUPPORT OF CHILD.
A decree for divorce embodied an agreement between husband and
wife for the provision of alimony and the support of the child. Subse-
quently, due to a change of conditions, the husband applied to the court
to decrease the amount of the weekly payments. Held, because of the
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contract between the parties, the decree could not be decreased although
an increase was permissible. Original decrees without such contracts
between spouses can be decreased or increased. Ferger v. Ferger, 46
OhioApp. 558, 189 N.E. 665 (934). The court refused as an
authority for a decrease the case of Corbett v. Corbett, 123 O.S. 543,
196 N.E. 146 (1930), which under identical facts allowed an increase
but made no mention of a decrease.
The decisions in Ohio, with the exception of Connolly v. Connolly,
16 Ohio App. 92 (1922), fail to distinguish between alimony for the
wife and for the support of the child and, considering them as one,
refuse to allow a decrease in the amount of the decree which was orig-
inally set by the agreement of the parties. Law v. Law, 64 O.5. 369,
6o N.E. 56o (19Ol); Clough v. Long, 8 Ohio App. 480 (1918);
Kettenring v. Kettenring, 29 Ohio App. 62, 163 N.E. 43 (1928);
Sargeant v. Sargeant, 8 O.N.P. 238, 11 O.D. 218 (19O1); Sponsellor
v. Sponsellor, I 10 O.5. 395, 2 Abs. 375 (1924); Hausaureck v. Mark-
breidt,.ddministrator, 68 0 .S. 554 (1903) ; Contra, Chapman v. Jones,
(934 Ohio App., never recorded).
To allow such a decrease, it is claimed, would be impairing the
obligation of contracts and so unconstitutional; however, an increase,
surprisingly enough, is allowed on public policy grounds, despite the fact
that the contract of the parties is being altered. Campbell v. Campbell,
46 Ohio App. 197, x88 N.E. 300 (933). The dissenting judge in
that case clearly pointed out this fallacy in the reasoning of the majority
of the court.
In Connolly v. Connolly, supra, the court allowed a decrease in the
decree for the support of the child but refused one for the support of the
wife. This distinction may be due to the fact that the child became, in
a sense, the ward of the court. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 15 O.S. 427
(1864). To the extent that the decree affects the infant, it may be
modified or changed by the court at any time during the child's minority.
Connett v. Connett, 81 Neb. 777, 116 N.W. 658 (19o8).
The majority of the courts throughout the United States permit the
increase or decrease of alimony for the wife or support of the child
whether or not there has been an agreement for the spouses setting the
exact amount incorporated in the divorce decree. Bed v. Bed, 218
Cal. 755, 24 Pac. (2d) 768 (1933); Soule v. Soule, 4 Cal. App. 87
Pac. 205 (19o6); Troyer v. Troyer, 177 Wash. 88, 30 Pac. (2d)
963 (1934); Morgan v. Morgan, 211 Ala. 7, 99 So. 185 (1924);
Pryorv. Pryor, 88 Ark. 302, 114 S.W. 700 (19o8); Gloth v. Gloth,
153 S.E. 879, 71 A.L.R. 700 (Va. 1930); A1dams v. Adams, 96
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Mont. 489, 31 Pac. (2d) 729 (1934); contra, Buck v. Buck, 6o
111.241 (x8 7 1); Dickeyv.Dickey, 15 4 Md. 6 7 5, 14 1A. 3 87 (1928);
Parker v. Parker, 55 Cal. App. 458, 203 Pac. 420 (1921). Though
the stipulations of the parties to alimony are usually adopted, the court
is not bound by them. Warren v. Warren, i i6 Minn. 458, 133 N.W.
1009 (1902). The contract is merely an advisory instrument for the
court, depending on the court's approval for its legal efficacy and effect.
Hayes v. Hayes, 75 S.W. (2d) 614 (Mo., 1934). Neither the parents
nor the court itself can deprive the court of its continuing jurisdiction
over the welfare and maintenance of minor children in divorce action.
Barrett v. Barrett, 39 Pac. (2d) 621 (Ariz., 1934). Considering the
social significance of these cases, the result is much to be preferred to
that based upon the impairment of the obligation of contact argument.
The recent case of Newkirk v. Newkirk, 129 O.S. 543, 196 N.E.
146 (935), without opinion, permitted a deduction in the divorce de-
cree and relied on Corbett v. Corbett, supra, as their authority. How-
ever, there was a conflict as to the existence of a contract between the
parties. In Higbee v. Higbee, another case decided without opinion on
October 23, 1935, the Supreme Court refused a motion to certify the
record of the lower courts. The Common Pleas and Court of Appeals
had held that the court had no jurisdiction to permit a decrease in the
obligation of the parties to the contract except upon showing duress or
fraud. Did the Newkirk case change the Ohio existing law? The Ohio
Supreme Court by failing to write an opinion in the last two cases has
missed an opportunity to lay down a definite rule on the subject in the
State of Ohio. Perhaps, from Newkirk v. Newkirk, supra, we may
infer that Ohio will tend to follow the recent trend of decisions of the
other states, i.e., a divorce decree that has embodied a contract of the
spouses for alimony for the wife and support of the child can be de-
creased or increased if the necessary circumstances are found for either.
HARRY A. GOLDMAN.
INTEREST
GRANTED BECAUSE OF UNREASONABLE DELAY IN PAYMENT TO
CREDITOR OF DECEDENT.
One Haskenkamp died Dec. 20, 1925. J. M. Murray, having a
claim for funeral services and expenses, presented the will for probate
on two different occasions, both times in the court of the wrong county.
The will was finally sent to Hamilton County, where the decedent had
lived, and was admitted to probate. The administrator had tendered the
